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Abstract I will discuss the relationship between two different accounts of remedial
duty ascriptions. According to one account, the beneficiary account, individuals who
benefit innocently from injustices ought to bear remedial responsibilities towards the
victims of these injustices. According to another account, the causal account,
individuals who caused injustices (even innocently) ought to bear remedial duties
towards the victim. In this paper, I examine the relation between the principles
central to these accounts: the Beneficiary Pays Principle and the well-established
principle of Strict Liability in law. I argue that both principles display a strong yet
unexplored similarity as they make certain kinds of causal connection sufficient for
incurring liability. Because of this similarity, I suggest that insights into the Ben-
eficiary Pays Principle can be gained from exploring its relation with Strict Lia-
bility. In particular, I examine two new positive arguments that could be adapted to
support of the Beneficiary Pays Principle: the Minimising Injustice Argument and
the Normative Connection Argument. However, I’ll show that only one of those
arguments, namely the Normative Connection Argument, can truly support the
Beneficiary Pays Principle. I conclude that, if you endorse the Normative Con-
nection Argument for Strict Liability, you have at least a strong prima facie reason
to endorse the parallel argument for the Beneficiary Pays Principle.
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My aim in this paper is to examine the relation between causal accounts, which
attribute remedial duties on the basis of a causal relation (such as the Principle of
Strict Liability) and beneficiary accounts, which attribute duties on the ground that
one benefits from injustice (such as the Beneficiary Pays Principle). In this paper, I
want to investigate the hitherto overlooked similarity between these two principles
of duty ascription. In particular, I will suggest that they have a deep connection:
they share the same commitment to regard certain kinds of causal relationship as
generating remedial duties. Accepting one of these principles might therefore
dispose its proponents to support the other.
Given this shared commitment, I will examine insights into the Beneficiary Pays
Principle that can be gleaned from the far more extensive literature on Strict
Liability. In particular, I will critically examine two positive arguments in favour of
Strict Liability, the Minimising Injustice Argument and the Normative Connection
Argument, to examine if they could be used to ground two new justifications for the
Beneficiary Pays Principle. To begin with, I’ll highlight that there is a tension
between the two arguments, as each supports a different version of the Beneficiary
Pays Principle. And to the extent that these two versions of the Beneficiary Pays
Principle differ at a very fundamental level, this might indicate to us that proponents
of the Beneficiary Pays Principle might thus endorse views that might be much more
at odds than previously thought, as I believe that both these arguments motivate
proponents of the Beneficiary Pays Principle.
Finally, I’ll show that the first argument, the Minimising Injustice Argument, fails
to support the most commonly accepted form of the Beneficiary Pays Principle
(despite the fact thatmany proponentsmight bewronglymotivated by it to endorse the
Beneficiary Pays Principle). The second argument, the Normative Connection
Argument, however might provide a more promising normative foundation for the
Beneficiary Pays Principle. I’ll conclude that, if you endorse a version of this second
argument in favour of Strict Liability, then you have, at the very least, a strong prima
facie reason to also endorse the parallel argument for the Beneficiary Pays Principle.1
1 It might be objected that the debate about strict liability is not parallel to that about the BPP but
orthogonal to it. Strict liability is a claim about liability irrespective of fault. The BPP is a claim about
liability irrespective of causal responsibility or fault. But—the objection goes—fault and causal
responsibility needn’t always align in this way. We can think of cases where the persons who benefit from
injustice are at fault, but the question may still arise whether they can be liable despite having no causal
responsibility for the injustice. In reply, let me note the following. First, I follow here the bulk of the
literature on the BPP in taking it to exclusively concern cases of innocently (viz. faultlessly) benefitting
from injustice. Lack of fault is therefore an essential component of both debates. Second, it is true that
one important disanalogy between Strict Liability and the BPP is that in the former one is causally
responsible for the harm/injustice and in the latter one isn’t. My entire argument revolves around the point
that although in the BPP case one isn’t causally responsible for the injustice, one is still causally related
to it in a way that can generate liability (via a kind of ‘moral taint’). The parallel I draw between the two
debates concerns the existence of a relevant causal relation. Third, my argument doesn’t require Strict
Liability and the BPP to be normatively identical or for me to deny important differences between the
two. It relies only on the weaker claim that there are structural parallels between the two that we can use
to shed light on the BPP and to address persistent worries about its normative grounds. Finally, I address
further the objection that the principles are too dissimilar in Sect. 7.3.
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2 The Beneficiary Pays Principle
There has been recently a great deal of debate within political philosophy about the
question of whether we should endorse the Beneficiary Pays Principle (henceforth
BPP), according to which those who innocently benefit from wrongdoing or
injustice hold duties (which, on different views, can take the form either of
compensation or the disgorging of all the acquired benefits). Accepting such a
corrective principle is almost certain to have many important implications in many
areas of political philosophy, including on the questions of who holds remedial
duties for the damages of climate change (Gosseries 2004; Shue 1999) or for the
past injustices committed by colonial powers (Butt 2012). The literature is divided
between those who think that such a principle has independent normative force
(Haydar and Øverland 2014; Butt 2007; Goodin and Barry 2014) and those who
think that the principle has no independent normative force and that the cases where
beneficiaries owe remedial duties to victims of injustice can be accounted for by
reference to other principles (Huseby 2013; Knight 2013).
According to the BPP, an agent can accrue remedial/disgorging duties merely in
virtue of benefitting from an injustice, even if she does so innocently, that is,
without having contributed to, instigated or encouraged in any way the commitment
of the injustice in question. Since the majority of the literature addresses innocent
benefitting, and the ground for justifying benefitting that is not innocent will differ
significantly, I will focus solely on innocent benefitting in this paper.2 The remedial
duty is owed first and foremost to the victims of the original injustice but—
according to the version of the principle that has gathered the most support—it
could also be owed to individuals who are currently suffering from the
consequences of the original injustice. But some defend a stronger version of the
principle according to which the duty could even be discharged to someone not
connected to the specific injustice, if the original victim is not around anymore or if
one can’t identify individuals suffering from the consequences of the original
injustice (Goodin 2013).
2.1 Qualifying the Benficiary Pays Principle
Proponents of the BPP have qualified the principle in various ways. But here I will
only focus on two qualifications that are crucial for my argument. I will return to
those qualifications in Sects. 6.1 and 7.5.
Among those who argue that this principle has independent normative force, the
majority of authors believe that the principle needs to be qualified in the following
two ways (Goodin and Barry 2014; Haydar and Øverland 2014).
Intention to benefit It has been argued that the presence of an intention to
benefit considerably strengthens the requirement to hold remedial duties
(Haydar and Øverland 2014). On this view, if a person commits an unjust act
2 For a discussion of benefitting that is not innocent, see Goodin and Pasternak (2016).
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with the intention to benefit the beneficiary, the beneficiary’s remedial duties
are greater because of that intention.3
Victim-centred versus Beneficiary-centred The victim-centred version of the
BPP focuses on ensuring that the victim gets compensated for the injustice; it
is thus mainly motivated by a concern for the victim. Because of this
motivation, on this version, the requirement to restitute the benefits disappears
if the victim is either (a) already compensated, (b) not around any more,
(c) not identifiable. This version of the principle is the one that predominates
in the literature. In contrast, the beneficiary-centred version of the BPP is
motivated by the wrongness of holding benefits resulting from injustices. On
this version of the principle, it is wrong in itself for the beneficiary to keep
these benefits because they are tainted. If this variant of the BPP is endorsed,
the beneficiary still has a duty to disgorge the benefits in the cases mentioned
above of (a), (b) or (c) (Goodin 2013).4
In what follows I will describe the transfer of gains from the beneficiary to the
victim as restitution or fulfilling a remedial duty (in the case of the victim-centered
version), but will use ‘disgorging’ when I discuss beneficiary-centered version of
the principle. Restitution compensates the victim (or compensate her as much as
feasible if the benefits are less than the harm). In contrast, disgorging involves
giving up the benefits without the intent of compensating the victim (possibly
because the benefits are morally tainted). When I speak of both, I will refer to either
‘‘remedial/disgorging duties.
2.2 Two objections to the Beneficiary Pays Principle
A successful defence of the BPP will need to address two key objections: The
Liability without Responsibility Objection and the Arbitrary Victim Objection.
Liability without Responsibility Objection: First, the BPP attributes remedial/
disgorging duties to innocent individuals who are not responsible for the
wrongdoing in question and this is controversial (Butt 2007; Fullinwider 2002).5 I
take substantive responsibility for an injustice here to mean having made the
voluntary decision to do something that brought about the injustice in question. The
view that innocent individuals ought to hold remedial/disgorging duties goes against
the grain of most political and legal philosophy of the last decades, which is based
3 Butt similarly argues that the BPP is easier to accept in cases involving such intention: ‘It is not a
necessary condition of having these duties that it was intended that we benefit from the act of injustice but
it may be that we can see our moral duties more clearly when this is indeed the case’ (Butt 2007, p. 146).
4 This distinction might remind of the distinction in law between two monetary remedies for wrongdoing;
‘restitutionary damages’ and disgorgement damages’. While restitutionary damages aim to reverse
wrongful transfers, disgorgement damages aim to strip the beneficiary of profit made by wrongful conduct
(Edelman 2002). Note that in law, these kinds of damages are attributed to those who wrongfully
benefitted (hence not innocent beneficiaries).
5 Note that the fact that one has made a voluntary decision doesn’t mean that one is ultimately morally
responsible. The arguments examined here do not need to commit themselves to specific views about
moral responsibility and freedom of the will.
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on the assumption that individuals should be held accountable only for things that
they are substantially responsible for.6
Arbitrary Victim Objection: Second, adopting the BPP leads to a state of affairs
in which we give special attention to victims when the injustices they suffer from
benefit others. But this seems counter-intuitive: Why should we arbitrarily
discriminate against victims on this basis (Huseby 2013; Knight 2013)?
3 Strict Liability
Let me now introduce causal accounts in the attribution of remedial duties along
with what I take to be its instantiation in law: the principle of Strict Liability.
Following John Gardner, I take Strict Liability to be liability regardless of fault or,
more specifically ‘liability that attaches to someone (call her D) for something she
did (call it x-ing) irrespective of any steps that she took in order not to x and
irrespective of whether she knew or had reason to know that she was x-ing’
(Gardner 2015, p. 207).7 The Strict Liability principle thus attributes remedial duties
to agents who merely caused harm.
It is worth making explicit several assumptions I will be making in what follows.
I will assume here a particularly influential account of causality which takes
causality to be best understood in terms of counterfactual conditionals of the type
‘‘If x didn’t occur, y would not have occurred’’ (Lewis 1973, 2000).8 Although
Strict Liability is a legal principle with a restricted scope, I will use the expression
‘Strict Liability’ to refer to what I take to be the underlying moral principle (Kramer
2005). And for now, I will leave aside the question of the field and limits of
application of this moral principle.9
The Principle of Strict Liability (and what has been called causal accounts of
duties ascription more generally) is controversial. On one hand, it is sometimes
perceived as having some legitimate role in attributing remedial duties (Miller
2001). For instance, in the case of climate change, it is often thought to be very
plausible to hold that those industrialised countries that caused the greatest
emissions of CO2 should pay the larger share of climate change costs- even if at
least during a substantial period of industrialisation, western countries didn’t know
about the environmental harm associated with it and thus cannot be taken to be
morally responsible for the harm caused during this period (Caney 2006, p. 472;
6 Consider, for instance, the predominant place that luck egalitarianism holds in debates on social justice.
Luck egalitarians argue that redistribution should track substantive responsibilities and that only
inequalities that do not result from agents’ differential responsibility should be corrected.
7 This corresponds to what Simester refers to as substantive Strict Liability: ‘an offence imposes
substantive Strict Liability when it contemplates the conviction of persons who are blameless for
committing that particular offence’ (Simester 2005, p. 23).
8 I found this account particularly congenial in thinking about benefitting cases. That said, I am not
committed to it and I believe other competing accounts of causality, such as a probabilistic ones, are also
compatible with the arguments presented here.
9 Note that in law, on the contrary, the concept of Strict Liability is restricted to specific fields of
application.
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Agarwal and Narain 1991; Simms 2005; Shue 1999). On the other hand, there is a
lot of philosophical opposition to Strict Liability for the same reason that the BPP is
opposed: Strict Liability attributes remedial duties to agents on the mere ground that
they played a causal role in bringing up a certain state of affairs, irrespective of
fault.10 This, once again, goes against some deeply entrenched views in moral
philosophy. For this reason, even though legal Strict Liability is tolerated in tort,
there is a widespread consensus that Strict Liability should not be used to determine
criminal punishment (Duff 2009; Lamond 2007, p. 610; Coleman 1976, p. 277).
4 The unexplored similarity between Strict Liability
and the Beneficiary Pays Principle
The BPP and Strict Liability share an essential feature that has been so far
overlooked in the political philosophy literature: they both make certain kinds of
causal connection sufficient for incurring liability. In order to highlight this
similarity, the two principles could be re-described in the following way:
According to Strict Liability, remedial duties are attributed to an agent, in the
absence of fault if this agent is at the incipient end of a causal chain of events
linking her to the harm incurred by another agent.
According to the BPP, remedial/disgorging duties are attributed to an agent, in
the absence of fault if this agent is at the recipient end of a causal chain of
events linking the benefits she receives to the wrong caused to another agent.
In order to illustrate this, let us consider the following traffic accident. Motorcyclist
Adam runs over Betty who is seriously wounded as a consequence. But Adam is
innocent of any negligence (say the individual who was really at fault for the
accident is a third individual, Elisabeth, who has pushed Betty into the road just as
Adam was driving by and has since then left the country). Because of the accident,
Betty can’t attend the final interview for an enviable job. The only other contender
at this stage, Jennifer, thus gets the job as a consequence of the accident (let us
assume that she would not have gotten the job had Betty attended the interview, as
Betty is a superior candidate). Jennifer benefitted thus innocently from the accident
while Adam blamelessly caused it. Both Adam and Jennifer are innocently
connected to the same causal structure.
10 It is important to note here that Strict Liability cover cases which involve the involuntary bringing
about of a harmful outcome as well as cases which involve a voluntary but justified decision to bring
about a harmful outcome. In a case discussed by Gardner (Vincent vs Lake Erie), the captain moors his
boat at a dock, while a storm is raging in order to save his crew and his vessel from damage. Damage to
the dock resulted and the owner of the dock was held entitled to compensation. In other words, the captain
was held legally responsible for the damages while not being at fault (Gardner 2005). Since the captain
made a decision to risk damages to the dock, he could be said to be substantively responsible as well as
legally responsible for the damages. This explains why the debate on Strict Liability should be understood
as focusing on the role of fault rather than on the role of responsibility. I am grateful to an anonymous




In this case, who should hold remedial duties towards Betty (the victim)? While
the Strict Liability principle would attribute remedial duties to Adam, the BPP
would attribute remedial duties to Jennifer.11 In both cases, the presence of a causal
relation constitutes at least part of the normative ground for attributing duties in the
absence of fault.
Let me consider straight away the following objection. In the case of Strict
Liability, the causal connection is a special kind of causal connection; there is
something special about initiating a causal chain.12 And the objection continues, if
Strict Liability differs substantially from the BPP, my attempt to draw on the
similarities between the two principles will fail.
But I don’t need to claim that any causal connection would be sufficient in order
to claim that Strict Liability and the BPP are importantly similar. In fact, in both
cases specific kinds of causal connection are taken to allow for the attribution of
remedial/disgorging duties.
Let me illustrate this by considering the case of Lisa throwing a stone into Anna’s
garden, damaging it as well as the edge at the border of the garden between Anna
and Leı¨la.13 But the damage caused by the stone thrown off by Lisa also leads Leı¨la
to find a piece of gold on her side of the edge. Let us further stipulate that, although
the piece of gold compensates Leı¨la for her damage and for the lost time and the
extra stress she endured from the whole story, she is now overall as well-off as she
used to be before the stone was thrown. She remains nevertheless connected
causally to the injustice committed by Lisa towards Anna. If any causal connection
was sufficient to attribute remedial duties, then Leı¨la would have accrued remedial
duties towards Anna. But this isn’t required by the BPP. So causal connection alone
doesn’t fully account for the attribution of remedial duties: benefitting itself plays a
role in accounting for the attribution of remedial duties. Benefitting from a
particular injustice is the kind of causal connection, which is sufficient to attribute
remedial duties. And something similar can be said about the Strict Liability
principle: causing an injustice to occur is not merely any causal connection; it is a
special kind of causal connection, whereby an agent is identified as instigating a
11 One might also endorse the view that both principles have a role and that the burden must thus be
shared between Adam and Jennifer (Huseby 2013).
12 I will consider another aspect of this objection in section (namely the claim that causing isn’t similar to
benefitting because of its relation to agency).
13 I owe this example to Robert Huseby.
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chain of events. So although not any causal connection would be sufficient to incur
remedial/disgorging duties, specific kinds of causal connections, such as benefitting
from injustices and causing an injustice to occur are sufficient.
I have argued so far that both principles share part of the same normative ground
and thereby encounter similar objections to their normative ground. Something else
could be said on the basis of that relationship, namely that, given that Strict Liability
is a widely accepted principle in law, some prima facie support should be gained by
the BPP. However, this support is tempered by the theoretical controversy attached
to the legitimacy of Strict Liability.14
5 Dispelling some of the force of the Liability without Responsibility
Objection
Because of this similarity between the BPP and the Strict Liability Principle, I
believe that at least some important insights into the BPP can be gained from an
examination of the sophisticated and more extensive literature on the Strict Liability
principle. But before I do that, let me first at least attempt to dispel some of the
worries that stem from the Liability without Responsibility Objection, which claims
that it is wrong to attribute remedial/disgorging duties to innocent individuals who
are not responsible for the wrongdoing in question. In other words, there seems to be
a resistance to the attribution of legal responsibility to those who are not
substantively responsible for the injustice in question.
But the assumption that we should have duties only if we are substantively
responsible is highly questionable. Other ethical principles which have gathered
considerable theoretical support attribute duties in the total absence of responsi-
bility. Take for instance, the duty of assistance (Singer 1972). According to the duty
of assistance, if ‘it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening,
without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought,
morally, to do it…’ (Singer 1972, pp. 231–232). If we can acquire duties to help
victims merely because we have the capacity to do so (without this causing a great
cost to ourselves), why couldn’t we acquire duties merely by benefitting from
injustices? Endorsing the Liability without Responsibility objection would under-
mine our commitment to widely endorsed principles, such as the duty of assistance
14 Does thatmean that if we accept the validity of the principle of Strict Liability, we are bound to accept the
legitimacyof theBPP?No, as one of these principlesmight be overall better justified: even in the absence of a
relevant normative distinction between the two, pragmatic reasons could still lead us to favor one principle
over the other. For instance, it is often argued that, by instituting Strict Liability, we would give further
incentives to individuals to avoid causing harm and that it is a good mechanism to allocate the costs of risk
creating activities (Stanton-Ife 2007, p. 155). But similar as yet undiscovered pragmatic reasons might exist
in favor of the BPP, as we might also be incentivised to become attentive to the source of our benefits and
refuse to, say, acquire some goods, which might have been produced under unjust conditions. By refusing
some benefits that could have resulted from injustices, we might prevent future similar injustices to be
created, in particular when injustices are committed in order to benefit specific others (Haydar and Øverland
2014) or when the injustices would not be committed in the absence of a demand (sweatshops benefit the
perpetrator and the beneficiary). So the similarity between the principles at the normative level cannot give
us direct definite answer on the role and importance of each of the principles.
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based on our capacity to remedy, which is a fairly commonplace principle in
political philosophy (Miller 2001).
In order to address a similar criticism, proponents of Strict Liability have pointed
out that a distinction ought to be made between stigmatising and non-stigmatising
offences. If no stigmatisation is attached to causing harm without fault, attributing
remedial duties to those who caused harm might be much less problematic (Simester
2005).15 Similarly, one might point out that the attribution of duties on the basis of
benefitting from injustice should not be seen as an attempt to stigmatise the
beneficiaries. And if no stigmatisation is attached to the holding of remedial duties
deriving from innocently benefitting from injustice, this would further undermine
the strength of the Liability without Responsibility objection. Part of what is
objected is that individuals are acquiring remedial duties for events they are not
responsible for. But acquiring remedial duties doesn’t entail that one did something
wrong in the case of non-stigmatising offences.16
Moreover, ensuring that individuals are endowed with goods they are substan-
tially responsible for is a commitment that might actually support the BPP. If it is
established that x’s benefits result from an injustice committed by others that he
didn’t intend or take part in, it is thereby shown that x is not substantially
responsible for bringing about the benefits in question. And if x is not substantially
responsible for these benefits, this undermines the entitlement x has to their benefits.
If x is not entitled to their benefits, this could thus at least lift an objection to the
repudiation of these benefits, namely the objection that x is entitled to them.
Finally, even if the beneficiary is not responsible for getting the benefits in the
first place, she is responsible for taking the decision to retain or not the benefits once
received (Butt 2007; Barry and Wiens 2014). We can conceive of benefitting as
involving a temporal notion. At t1, the beneficiary gets a certain good connected to
an injustice x. Putting aside cases in which one would need to accept the benefits in
order to first receive them, it is true that, at t1, the beneficiary is not voluntarily
deciding to get the benefits and can’t thus be held responsible for holding them. But
at t2, the beneficiary decides to retain or not the benefits. If she decides to retain
them, she is thus voluntarily keeping the benefits at t2. The beneficiary at t2 is thus
responsible for keeping the benefits.
6 The Minimising Injustice Argument17
It has been argued—persuasively, in my view—that current attempts to defend the
BPP have so far failed to give it a persuasive normative foundation (cf. Huseby 2013;
Knight 2013). One interesting upshot of the analogy to Strict Liability is that it
15 For a critique of this argument, see Stanton-Ife (2007).
16 Some might still object that the holding of remedial/disgorging duties would be tantamount to
punishment. And punishment can only be justified if the person is found guilty of some criminal violation.
But, in the non-stigmatising case of innocently benefitting from injustice, the holding of remedial/
disgorging duties doesn’t amount to punishment.
17 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting I use the expression ‘minimizing injustice’.
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suggests two new justifications for the BPP that draw on arguments first put forward
in defence of Strict Liability. The first one is what I will call the Minimising Injustice
Argument. This argument relies on the consideration that a principle that incurs costs
to innocent individuals might nevertheless be justified when the alternatives lead to
results that are even more unjust. In this case, the alternative we want to avoid is the
one in which the innocent victim has to carry all the costs on her own.18
Even in legal systems regulated by the fault principle, which attributes remedial
duties to agents who are at fault for causing harm (Feinberg 1970, p. 187), the
application of the fault principle is really the exception rather than the rule (Coleman
1976). The burden of proof remains with the victim to show that the losses should not
stay with her. As a consequence, in tort litigation, losses lie most often where they fall
and the victim carries the burden of the injustice that befell upon her. In other words,
the recognition that remedial duties should be attributed to those at fault doesn’t ensure
that the victim will be compensated. In this context, the principle of Strict Liability
might strike us as being not strikingly more unfair than the alternative, the fault
principle, given that the latter often fails to ensure that only those who are at fault have
to bear the costs of wrongdoing or harm (Kramer 2005, p. 332).
There is thus nothing radical in having agents bear the costs of events for which
they are not at fault: it happens on a daily basis for victims which haven’t succeeded
in showing that the losses should not stay with her. In these kinds of circumstances,
we cannot obtain a perfectly just distribution of duties, but we might still try to
minimise injustices. This is why Strict Liability can be said to be a principle that
minimises injustice in non-ideal circumstances.
Now, a similar argument could be induced to support the BPP. Of course, it would
be better if we could attribute remedial duties to the wrongdoer and ensure that the
wrongdoer fulfils his remedial duties to the victim. But in the world as it is, this is often
impossible. Sometimes, the responsible individuals aren’t around anymore, some-
times they aren’t in a position inwhich they can compensate the victim and sometimes,
even more frustratingly, the relevant individuals can’t be shown to be at fault. In all
these cases, in circumstances that are non-ideal, even if we can’t attribute remedial
duties to the individual(s) responsible for the wrong, we must still find a way of
attributing remedial duties which minimises injustices. And attributing remedial
duties to the beneficiary isn’t more unfair than letting the victim of the injustice bear
the burden on her own. So, even if one believes that there is something unfair in
attributing remedial duties to innocent beneficiaries, as the BPP recommends, it might
be evenworse to let the victims bear the cost, and to that extent, the BPPmight bemore
attractive as a principle of duty attribution than previously thought.
6.1 What version of the Beneficiary Pays Principle does the Minimising
Injustice Argument support?
However, endorsing such an argument in favour of the BPP has important
implications for the kind of BPP one is justified to endorse.
18 For an example of this intuition, see Shue (2015, pp. 16–17).
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First, such an argument can only support a victim-centred version of the
principle. If our concern is to ensure that the victim doesn’t have to bear the costs of
the injustice, then there should be no requirement to repudiate the benefits when this
doesn’t help the victim.19
Second, such an argument cannot take the intention of the wrongdoer as
normatively relevant. The intentions of the wrongdoer don’t have in themselves any
impact on how badly off a victim ends up being. Given that the principle is held
because we care about alleviating the victim’s burden as the Minimising Injustice
Argument holds, the intentions of the wrongdoer are irrelevant to the attribution of
remedial duties.
Finally, the Minimising Injustice Argument implies that what motivates the BPP
is a concern for the victims of the injustice. However, if this is the case, it isn’t clear
why such a concern should not extend towards victims who have suffered mere
harm instead of injustice. The Minimising Injustice Argument on its own doesn’t
have thus the resources to draw a distinction between harm and injustice. But most
proponents of the BPP restrict its application only to benefits resulting from
injustices and, with the exception of Haydar (2009), reject its extension to benefits
resulting from mere harm.20 So endorsing the Minimising Injustice Argument would
have significant further revisionary implications for the BPP.
6.2 Why the Minimising Injustice Argument ultimately fails to support
the Benefiiary Pays Principle
First, as I have just highlighted above, the Minimising Injustice Argument on its
own can’t support the version of the BPP which is held by the majority of its
proponents, that is, a version which discriminates between victims of harm and
victims of injustice (Goodin and Barry 2014; Haydar and Øverland 2014; Butt
2007). Instead, it supports a revisionary and much broader version of the principle,
which grounds restitution to victims of harm as well as injustice. Most proponents of
the principle are likely to reject this extension. This doesn’t bode well for the
Minimising Injustice Argument.
Second, the Minimising Injustice Argument fails to respond to the Arbitrary
Victim Objection, which highlighted the arbitrariness of helping only those victims
that have suffered an injustice which benefitted a third party. Given that the
19 I don’t want to suggest here that no argument could be made in support of the claim that benefits from
injustices ought to be disgorged even when they don’t help the victim (in fact the Causal Connection
Argument I explore later in this paper could support a beneficiary-centred version of the BPP, which
would attribute duties to disgorge even when this can’t benefit the victim). Some authors have argued
along these lines (Goodin 2013). In law, gain-based disgorgements greater than what is needed to
compensate the victim have been justified on the ground that they could provide a deterrent (Edelman
2002). In this section, I aim to highlight that endorsing the Minimising Injustice Argument can only
support a victim-centred version of the BPP.
20 This distinction might appear surprising. One might even want to investigate whether such a
distinction is reasonable. For my purposes here, I merely want to point out that this distinction can’t be
supported by the Minimising Injustice Argument. This however shouldn’t lead us to reject the distinction,
as other arguments in support of the BPP not considered here might be able to justify it.
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Minimising Injustice Argument doesn’t show that there is anything special about the
relation between the victim and the beneficiary of the injustice, it can’t really give a
plausible explanation for why we should discriminate between victims and help
only those whose injustice benefitted us.
Finally, and decisively, the argument on its own can’t provide specific support to
the BPP. If what matters is to avoid a situation in which the victim alone bears the
costs, other principles could also be said to achieve this: we could attribute remedial
duties randomly (by attributing the duties to everyone born on the same day as the
victim say); collectively (more reasonably), by pooling all the costs generated by
injustices or even by combining different principles.21 In order to argue specifically
in favor of the BPP, the argument needs to explain why (at least some) remedial
duties ought to be attributed specifically to the beneficiaries of a particular injustice
(over other potential duty-holders). The Minimising Injustice argument on its own
merely excludes a principle according to which the victim would bear the burden on
her own. The Minimising Injustice Argument on its own can’t thus support
specifically the BPP—or the principle of Strict Liability, for that matter. It just
supports a whole category of principles of remedial duties: those principles which
won’t leave the victim carry the whole burden on her own.
7 The Normative Connection Argument
This seems to highlight a necessary requirement for the BPP to be plausible: we
need to find a reason that would explain why it would be appropriate to attribute
remedial/disgorging duties specifically to the beneficiaries of the injustice and not to
anyone else. Barring this, we would have no support for the BPP as such. Let us thus
consider the possibility that this reason might be partly given by the special relation
that is established by the causal connection between an injustice and a beneficiary.
7.1 The Normative Connection Argument for the principle of Strict
Liability
Given that there is some puzzlement as to how exactly causal relations could ground
a normative relation (Huseby 2013), I want now to propose possible moves that are
available to those who wish to defend the normative relevance of causal relations.
Once again, we can gain some insight by drawing on the literature on Strict
Liability. There are three possible basis for establishing that there is a normative
connection between an agent and her faultless deeds.
First, in order to provide a normative defence for the principle of Strict Liability,
Matthew Kramer has tied the infringement of a moral right with a duty to remedy it
irrespective of whether or not the person who caused the right to be infringed is at
21 I don’t want to imply that the different principles I examine in this paper (including Strict Liability) are
rivals. We could combine different principles by, for instance making the person who is strictly liable
responsible for insuring, and hence spreading, the losses (I owe this suggestion to an anonymous reviewer
for this Journal). Or in the case of the BPP, by making the beneficiary responsible for insuring.
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fault. According to him, the (blameless) infringement of a moral right correlates
with a moral duty to remedy it via apologies, compensation, restitution or
punishment (Kramer 2005). If an individual’s moral right is infringed by x, x has a
duty to remedy the situation in some way.22
To drive this point home, Kramer considers the case of George who is convicted
and jailed for 6 years for a crime that he hasn’t committed (Kramer 2005).
Assuming that the court fulfilled adequately the requirements of procedural fairness
and that all the officials in the system had an impeccable behaviour throughout, it is
still the case that George’s moral right to be free has been infringed. And it is
plausible to believe that George is nevertheless owed at least an apology by the
court, despite the fact that the court has done no wrong (Kramer 2005). On this
picture, irrespective of whether or not the person who caused the right to be
infringed is at fault, he owes a remedy to the individual whose moral right has been
infringed (Kramer 2005). The absence of fault might thus have an impact on the
nature and size of the appropriate remedy, but it can’t fully exonerate (Kramer
2005). In Kramer’s case, it is the very nature of rights, which ultimately justifies the
irrelevance of fault in cases regulated by Strict Liability.
Second, John Gardner has put forward the claim that morally blameless actions
can have an effect on their agent’s ‘‘moral situation’’ (Gardner 2015). According to
him, in the cases in which an agent is morally blameless yet causally connected to
harming someone, it is still the case that the agent in question is morally bound to
repair, apologise or explain (Gardner 2015).23 And this recognition that we are
morally bound to offer some justification must lead us to admit that morally
blameless actions are capable of having ‘‘unwelcome moral consequences for their
agents’’ (Gardner 2015). There are different possible interpretations of what
ultimately supports Gardner’s view.24
One possible interpretation of Gardner’s view is linked to Gardner’s conception
of reasons. In Wrongs and Faults, Gardner claims that:
Reasons await full conformity. If one does not fully conform to a reason—if
one does not do exactly what it is a reason to do—the reason does not
evaporate. It does not evaporate even though one was justified in not
conforming to it. It does not evaporate even though it is now too late fully to
conform to it. Instead, it now counts as a reason for doing the next best
22 The remedy principle: If and only if x holds vis-a`-vis y a moral right against y’s phi-ing, y’s phi-ing
will place y under a moral obligation to x to remedy the resultant situation in some way.
23 ‘‘Morally blameless actions often do change their agent’s moral situation for the worse. Often their
agent is morally bound to repair, to mitigate, to apologize, or to explain. Explaining includes offering a
justification or excuse.’’ (Gardner 2015, p. 3).
24 One possible interpretation that I won’t discuss here is that this normative claim ultimately relies on
Gardner’s conception of ‘responsibility in the basic sense’ as the ‘ability to offer justifications and
excuses- or alternatively the ability to explain oneself, to offer an account of oneself, to answer for
oneself’ (Gardner 2007). I won’t discuss this possibility further here, as this conception of responsibility
is not widely supported but it could ground the claim that morally blameless actions can have an effect on
the agent’s moral situation as individuals are responsible in this sense even when they are not
substantively responsible.
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thing, and failing that, the next best thing again, and so on. (Gardner 2005,
p. 103)
On this view, if a duty is violated, and an injustice is committed, the same reason
that counted against violating the duty would now count in favour of the provision
of reparations, justifications, excuses or apologies. So Strict Liability might be due
to the fact that reasons do not disappear but remain to count ‘as a reason for doing
the next best thing’. The holding of remedial/disgorging duties might just be a way
of responding to these reasons.
Third, another possible basis for claiming that there is a normative connection
between an agent and her faultless deeds is to see if it appeals to our considered
judgments about cases.25 Consider, for example, the following case: if I lose my
balance in the bus because of a sharp turn and, despite holding myself steady with
my two hands on a bar, fall upon another fellow passenger harming him on the way,
I would be expected to apologise and help in caring for his injury. The fact that we
have the considered judgement that we feel obligated to repair, apologise or explain
in similar cases suggests that, despite having taken all the possible measures to
avoid causing the harm in question, there is something owed to the victim.
Both Gardner and Kramer have suggested that we owe something to those we
have blamelessly harmed. But this presupposes the normative relevance of causal
relations: something is owed towards the victim when I blamelessly harm her
because there is something special about the relation I have towards the
consequences of my actions. In order to capture this more fundamental intuition,
consider Bernard Williams’ case of the lorry driver who innocently runs over a
child:
[He] will feel differently from any spectator…. Doubtless, and rightly, people
will try, in comforting him, to move the driver from this state of feeling, move
him indeed from where he is to something more like the place of a spectator,
but it is important that this is seen as something that should need to be done,
and indeed some doubt would be felt about a driver who too blandly or readily
moved to that position. We feel sorry for the driver, but the sentiment co-exists
with, indeed presupposes, that there is something special about his relation to
this happening, something which cannot merely be eliminated by the
consideration that it was not his fault. (Williams 1981, p. 28).
By appealing to our emotions, this illustration could be used to directly defend the
normative relevance of mere causal relation, although in doing so we might be
departing from Williams’s own purposes. And the sense that we owe something
towards the victim derives from this more fundamental sense that an innocent causer
is normatively linked to the causal consequences of her action. If this attempt to
show the normative significance of causal relations is successful, it might help
25 The justification of such considered judgments can be understood in several ways—as based in their
intrinsic plausibility upon reflection, as based on prior intuitions or sentiments that survive critical
scrutiny, or as the customary inputs to reflective equilibrium. For my purposes, it is enough that such
appeals to our considered judgments are in line with standard practice in moral and political philosophy—
including in the debates on the BPP and Strict Liability.
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constitute the Normative Connection Argument in defence of the BPP. These cases
suggest that the consequences of our faultless action might still be ours to remedy,
simply in virtue of our standing to them in a certain causal relation. If this is
accepted, then one worry about the BPP is already weakened. I will now turn to
consider more directly whether similar ideas can be applied at the other end of the
causal chain.
7.2 The Normative Connection Argument for the Beneficiary Pays
Principle
I have just described above the view that there could be moral consequences in
causing harm innocently. Now I wish to consider whether parallel arguments could
be used to support the BPP. To the extent that beneficiaries are causally connected
to an injustice, could there be similar moral consequences for being at the receiving
end of the causal chain? If both benefiting and causing are relevant forms of causal
connections, then it seems reasonable to inquire whether we could acquire remedial/
disgorging duties by benefitting from injustices as well as by causing injustices.
Again, there are three ways one could argue for the claim that the causal
connection in cases of innocent benefitting matters normatively. The first two
ground it in an argument along the lines of those put forward by Kramer and
Gardner. The other approach would be to ground it more directly in our considered
judgments about relevant cases.
First, following Kramer, one might venture that when fundamental rights are
violated, it is in the nature of rights that they generate duties to remedy the violation
of these rights. Now in George’s case of wrongful incarceration, the court is held
accountable for the wrong done to George and at least owe him an apology. But in a
case in which the individual who violated the right is not longer around, one might
venture that, in the absence of someone identifiable as responsible for this right
violation, those who benefitted from this right violation could legitimately be asked
to hand back their benefits. Take the case of a painting stolen during the Second
World War and now in the possession of someone who bought it off someone else.
Although the buyer is not at fault, the painting is a benefit that accrued to him as a
result of substantial right violations. This could ground a duty on his part to hand the
painting back to the descendants of the victims of these right violations. The initial
right violation might thus generate duties to remedy the violation, even in the
absence of fault, and these duties might be attributed to those who innocently
benefitted from the violation. The limitation of this argument (if it is a limitation) is
that it restricts the relevant injustices to those involving right violations.
Second, a similar argument that would avoid this limitation would appeal to the
claim about reasons underlying Gardner’s argument for Strict Liability. If there was
a reason against committing certain injustices, then, if these injustices are
nevertheless committed, the same reasons might ground a duty to remedy them.
And, if those who committed the injustice can’t uphold this duty (because they are
not around any more or because they are not in a position to), then the reasons for
this injustice to be remedied subsist and need to be ‘transferred’ to someone else.
The fact that some have benefitted from the injustice would identify these
The Beneficiary Pays Principle and Strict Liability…
123
beneficiaries as the relevant duty holders to remedy the injustice in question. After
all, they only possess these benefits because the injustice had occurred. In support of
this view, consider the fact that the benefits are often described in the literature as
‘tainted’. These benefits are considered to be morally tainted because of their causal
source in an injustice (Goodin 2013; Pasternak 2014; Parr 2016). These specific
benefits thus seem an appropriate source for a remedy for that very injustice given
that the wrongdoer can’t remedy the injustice herself.26
Third, one could ground this argument on our considered judgments about
relevant cases. Consider, for example, the following case:
Benefitting from Terrorism Terrorists decide that, if they succeed in severely
injuring a certain number of individuals, ten cheques of 10,000 euros will be
randomly sent to individuals. Now, imagine that you happen to be one of the
ten individuals who receive a cheque of 10,000 euros. Would you feel entitled
to keep part of this money? Or would you rather feel that you owe at least part
(if not all) of the money to the victims?
It would be odd to deny that being the beneficiary of terrorist acts connects you
(albeit involuntarily) to those terrorist acts. And, it would be implausible for you not
to judge that you owe something to the victims. Imagine an encounter between
yourself and one of the victims. Even in the case in which you had strong moral
grounds for keeping the money (say, because you intend to give it to society’s worse
off), wouldn’t you feel that you at least owe the victim a strong justification? If you
would feel morally bound to offer such a justification as a result of your benefitting
in this and similar cases, this strongly suggests that innocently benefiting from
injustice, like causing harm without fault, also affects the moral situation of the
beneficiary. Or, at least this seems to follow from accepting the validity of
Gardner’s analogous claim in favor of the principle of Strict Liability. So this
example, like Williams’s case of the lorry driver, seems to point to a strong
conviction that we can become involuntarily connected to an injustice and accrue
remedial/disgorging duties by merely passively benefitting from it. Or at least, if
you find that examples such as Williams’s offer support to Strict Liability then you
also have prima facie reasons to accept a version of the BPP.
These considerations might thus lead us to endorse the claim that we can be
normatively connected to an injustice and accrue remedial/disgorging duties by
merely passively benefitting from injustice. If that is the case, attributing remedial/
disgorging duties to the beneficiary would appear to be a natural consequence of this
change in moral situation. And we may need to own up to things that we are
26 It is not clear that these arguments adapted from the arguments articulated by Gardner and Kramer can
be made without any reliance on some considered judgments about what kinds of connection is
normatively relevant. In these arguments, there is an implicit assumption that the beneficiary is the fitting
duty-holder. Let us assume that you accept the claim that it is in the nature of rights to demand
remediation when they are violated or that you accept Gardner’s claim that the reasons that stood against
the violation of certain rights are still pressing us to do the ‘next best thing’. Either way, the argument
assumes that the beneficiaries (or the causal agents in the original arguments) are the relevant duty-




blamelessly connected to, whether these are the deeds of our ancestors or of our
contemporaries, if these deeds have benefitted us.27
7.3 First objection to the Normative Connection Argument: the specialness
of agency
It might be objected that there is an important disanalogy between our convictions
about cases relevant to Strict Liability and those relevant to the BPP. Judith Jarvis
Thomson has argued that our inclination to judge that causality matters in cases
invoking Strict Liability could be explained by reference to the value of freedom of
action (Thomson 1984). And the insightful remarks of Kramer, Gardner, and
Williams are all about the relation between an agent and her action. But, innocent
benefitting seems to be passive. And, if that is the case, this would introduce a major
difference between the BPP and Strict Liability. This major difference might lead us
to think that benefitting and causing are two very different kinds of causal
connections and therefore have different normative implications.
There are two answers that can be given to this objection. First, it is not
necessarily the case that those who are at the beginning of a causal chain are more
active than beneficiaries. In order to show this, we can design scenarios in which
one passively causes something to happen and in which one benefits by actively
doing something. Take the following example: I could be sitting on a bench, while
you jog past me. Because you were immersed in your thoughts, as you jog along,
you get scared by suddenly seeing another person and fell, badly hurting yourself. I
am definitely one of the causes of your harm, but I was not actively doing anything.
Inversely, consider a scenario in which the more an individual acts in a certain way,
the more he benefits from an injustice. Imagine the case in which there are two
citizens of a well-to-do nation, each working at the same job. Whereas A is working
7 h a day, B is working 9 h a day and is remunerated extra for these two extra hours.
Suppose that the well-to-do nation they are both citizens of, has waged an unjust
war, which benefitted the economy of this nation. By being citizens of this nation,
they both benefit (let us assume innocently) from this war. If we assume that the
benefits to them deriving from the unjust war is proportional to their salary, B would
benefit more from the war than A. But B would get this extra benefit through his
extra hours of active work. As these illustrations show, we cannot thus assume that
beneficiaries are passive, or that causal agents are necessarily active.
Second, to the extent that the Normative Connection Argument is ultimately
based on our considered judgments, then it is sufficient that such convictions arise in
response to cases such as Benefitting from Terrorism. What is crucial is whether in
Benefitting from Terrorism, one would feel morally bound to offer apology,
27 An implication of the non-identity problem is that in many cases, current people can’t be said to be
benefitting from past injustices if these injustices are also conditions for their existence, as there is no
alternative world in which they exist but don’t benefit (Caney 2006). Some have suggested that the BPP
isn’t entirely vulnerable to that objection as it could merely limit its application (Barry and Kirby 2017).
Others have suggested possible ways of avoiding the problem altogether (Butt 2007). However, I am
putting aside the controversy related to this issue.
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explanation or justification. If one does, then this supports the claim that being at the
incipient end of a causal chain is not necessary for a normative connection to be
established.
Finally, recall that, even in cases where a beneficiary benefits passively, once
considered cross-temporally, being a beneficiary is not constituted merely by the
actions and decisions of others: the beneficiary at t 2, decides to retain or repudiate
the benefits. At t 2, the beneficiary is thus not merely a passive beneficiary but a
beneficiary who has made a decision and is thus ‘active’ in this sense.
7.4 Second objection to the Normative Connection Argument: the content
of the moral debt
Another objection would point out that the crucial question is not whether an
innocent beneficiary from injustice would feel morally bound to say or do
something towards the victim of the injustice but what she would feel morally
bound to do. After all, even innocent bystanders might have duties towards victims
of injustice, so the proponents of the BPP need to show that beneficiaries’ duties
differ significantly from those of mere bystanders. In cases such as Benefitting from
Terrorism, what the beneficiary would feel morally bound to do might help indicate
whether or not the duties that a beneficiary has towards the victim of an injustice
differ from the duties that a bystander has. If our considered judgments about this
case attribute the same duties to both beneficiaries and bystanders, this would
undermine the claim that beneficiaries have the special duties the BPP attributes to
them.
I will focus here on whether beneficiaries have a duty to regret that differs from
those of mere bystanders. One might wonder first, why I focus on regret, as the
ultimate function of the BPP is to ground compensatory duties. It is not my intention
here to suggest that, only regret is owed towards victims of injustice. What I want to
establish is whether beneficiaries have special duties in virtue of the fact that they
are beneficiaries (duties that the bystander doesn’t have). If beneficiaries have
special duties, we can then investigate what they are. And what they are might differ
depending on the specific cases at hand. But the first thing to be established is that
there are such distinctive duties that only beneficiaries have.
It does seem plausible that the innocent beneficiary doesn’t need to apologise but
merely to express regret. And if one accepts this claim, then it isn’t clear to what
extent an innocent beneficiary could be distinguished from an innocent bystander, as
he too could feel the need to express regret when witnessing an injustice. So even if
the thought experiment shows that something is owed to the victim, as long as this is
merely, say, the expression of regret, this fails to show that the beneficiary has a
special relation towards the victim.
In response to the objection, one could say the following. Even if we grant that
regret might be the only thing owed by the beneficiary, one could still argue that
there are nevertheless three significant differences between the bystander’s
expression of regret and the innocent beneficiary’s expression of regret. First, the
beneficiary might have a duty to express regret, whereas the innocent bystander
doesn’t have such a duty. It is merely supererogatory of him to express such regret.
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Moreover, the duty, which the beneficiary might have is second-personal: he ought
to express regret to the victim, whereas the bystander could express regret to
anyone. In other words, there is a difference in the addressee of the regret. Finally,
the innocent beneficiary and the bystander would express different kinds of regret.
The beneficiary would express a form of regret that is intimately connected to her
life; she would look at parts of her life (at least those parts that were affected by the
benefits in question) in a different way. The regret in question would permeate the
content of her own life. In contrast, the bystander would express a form of
impersonal regret, a kind of regret that is detached from her life. So even if the
objection might reject the claim that the innocent beneficiary ought to apologise, it
still doesn’t actually undermine the main claim that the innocent beneficiary has
duties to do certain things as a result of her being the beneficiary of some event or
action, even if she is not culpable for it.28
7.5 What kind of Beneficiary Pays Principle does the Normative
Connection Argument lead us to endorse?
If we accept the claim that causal connection is normatively relevant, then what
kind of BPP should be endorsed? First, if benefiting from injustice is a normatively
relevant connection between an injustice and a beneficiary, then the argument might
favour a beneficiary-centred version of the principle. On this principle, there is a
reason to disgorge the benefits even in the absence of an identifiable victim, as it
would be wrong to keep benefits connected in this way to an injustice.
Second, if we endorse the Normative Connection Argument, would intentions to
benefit matter? If the normative relevance of causal relations is primarily based on
our considered judgments about relevant cases, then the response to that question
will depends on whether or not intending to benefit a third party has an impact on
these considered judgments. And it would seem that it does (Haydar and Øverland
2014). If one endorses the argument, the normative connection could possibly be
said to be strengthened by the presence of an intention to benefit the beneficiary on
the part of the wrong-doer. Thus the Normative Connection Argument could support
giving normative significance to a wrongdoer’s intentions to benefit a third party
when committing a wrongdoing.29
28 Moreover, once again, although the beneficiary is not responsible for receiving the benefits at t1, she is
responsible for keeping the benefits received at t2 and, to that extent, contributes directly to an unjust
distribution of goods. From this perspective, apologies, compensation or punishment might thus still be
required.
29 But if the normative relevance of causal relations is based on the claim that we have reasons to remedy
injustices, then intentions might matter less. But, as mentioned above, it is not clear to me that the claim
can identify beneficiaries as the fitting duty-bearers without ultimately relying on certain considered
judgments.
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8 Conclusion
I have argued here that there is an important parallel between the principle of Strict
Liability and the BPP as they both take special kinds of causal relationships to be
sufficient to incur remedial/disgorging duties. Drawing on this parallel, I have
examined whether two positive arguments previously introduced in support of Strict
Liability could be adapted to ground a defence of the BPP.
I pointed out that these two arguments, the Minimising Injustice Argument and
the Normative Connection Argument, are committed to support two different
versions of the BPP. To the extent that these two versions of the BPP differ at a very
fundamental level, proponents of the BPP might thus endorse views that might be
much more at odds than previously imagined—views that differ both in content and
in their underlying justification, if they rely –implicitly or not- on one of these
arguments.
I have also argued that the Minimising Injustice Argument fails to give, on its
own, specific support to the BPP. At best it could only exclude one alternative
distribution of remedial duties, that of leaving the burden to fall on the victim alone.
Given that I suspect that the Minimising Injustice Argument is what actually
motivates many of the proponents of the BPP who support a victim-centred version
of the principle, this conclusion might lead them to endorse the Normative
Connection Argument and a beneficiary-centred version of the principle, to look for
another normative ground for the victim-centred version of the principle or even
potentially to give up on the BPP. Moreover, this means that the most prevalent
version of the BPP, the victim-centred version, is still on the lookout for a
convincing normative ground.
The Normative Connection Argument, in any of its different versions, however,
offers a promising and hitherto unexplored normative foundation to the BPP. The
force of this argument may depend on whether the relevant considered judgments
about the normative significance of faultless causal connection to injustice are
widely shared and on whether these judgments ultimately survive critical scrutiny.
At the very least the following is true: that if you endorse a version of the Normative
Connection Argument for Strict Liability broadly along the lines of the arguments
examined here by Kramer and Gardner, then you have a strong prima facie reason to
also endorse the parallel argument for the BPP.
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